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I. Introduction
THE LAW OF TAKINGS is divided into two principal parts: physical and
regulatory. In the first category is that which we call eminent domain
or compulsory purchase. With one exception (inverse condemnation),
a physical taking occurs when government intends to take land or an
interest in land. A regulatory taking occurs when government, through
the exercise of the police or regulatory power, so burdens land, or an
interest in land with land-use regulations that courts treat the action as
if government had intended physically to exercise eminent domain or
"take" the land. U.S. Supreme Court cases govern most aspects of tak-
ings on the theory that either the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution ("[n]or shall private property be taken for public use without the
payment of just compensation")' or the Fourteenth Amendment ("[nior
shall private property be taken without due process of law")2 applies
to both physical and regulatory takings.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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In regulatory takings, if a land-use regulation (zoning, subdivision,
and so forth) goes "too far" in reducing the use of a parcel of land,
then it is a taking requiring compensation, just as if the government
physically took or condemned an interest in (or all of) the land.' This
basic principle was established in 1922 in the Supreme Court case of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.4 The question, of course, is what is
"too far"?
Many times in the past dozen years, the Court has reiterated its un-
derstanding that state and local governments may regulate the use of
land under the police power for the health, safety, and welfare of the
people, without violating constitutional proscriptions against the taking
of property without compensation.5 However, the Court has also laid
down guidelines for when a regulation takes property.6 These fall into
two categories: total or per se takings and partial takings. 7
In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,8 the Supreme Court addressed the effect
that "notice" of an existing regulation has on both classes of regulatory
takings. The Court held that the "acquisition of title after the effective
date of [a] regulation" does not automatically bar either type of regu-
latory taking claim.9 In the opinion, the Court also softened the ripeness
barrier 0 and clarified the meaning of "economically viable use.""
Equally important are the issues that Palazzolo foreshadowed but left
undecided. Specifically, the Court indicated a willingness to revisit the
denominator issue'" and the concurring opinions revealed an ideologi-
3. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The Court in Pennsyl-
vania Coal made it abundantly clear that the decision was not an attack on all land-
use controls. Indeed, just a year later, the same Court upheld local zoning against a
Fourteenth Amendment attack (taking of property without due process of law). See,
e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
4. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
5. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
6. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
7. See, e.g., id.
8. 121 S. Ct. 2448 (2001).
9. Id. at 2465. Justice Kennedy authored the opinion in which the Chief Justice
and Justices Thomas, Scalia, and O'Connor joined. In addition, Justice Stevens con-
curred that the taking was ripe for review. See id. at 2468. For the section discussing
the Palazzolo facts and procedural history, see id. at 2454-55.
10. In Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172
(1985), the Court held that a regulatory taking claim is not ripe and cannot be brought
"until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a
final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue." Id.
at 186 (emphasis added). For the section discussing the ripeness requirement, see Pal-
azzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458-62.
11. A total or "per se" taking occurs when a regulation denies a property owner all
"economically viable or beneficial use" of her land. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
For the section applying this test, see Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
12. See id. at 2465.
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cal split regarding the meaning of "investment-backed expectations,"
the resolution of which will have a profound impact on partial takings
jurisprudence. 3
II. The Case
In 1959, Anthony Palazzolo and some associates formed Shore Gar-
dens, Inc. to purchase and hold three undeveloped parcels on Winna-
paug Pond in Westerly, Rhode Island.' 4 Palazzolo soon became the sole
shareholder and Shore Gardens commenced efforts to develop its prop-
erty." Since much of the land was salt marsh, considerable fill was
needed to stabilize the land for building. 16 Shore Gardens therefore
submitted several development proposals to the Rhode Island Division
of Harbors and Rivers beginning in 1962,17 all of which the division
denied.I8
The property sat idle for over a decade.19 During that time, Rhode
Island designated all salt marshes as "coastal wetlands. °20 That desig-
nation significantly limited the scope of permissible development. 21 In-
deed, any filling of or building on Winnapaug Pond or adjacent lands
required a "special exemption" from the council.22 To qualify for such
an exemption, "the proposed activity must serve 'a compelling public
purpose which provides benefits to the public as a whole as opposed
to individual or private interests.' '23
13. See id. at 2465-68. Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia filed separate concurring
opinions in which each attacked the other's conclusion as to the impact a preexisting
regulation has on investment-backed expectations. Compare id. at 2465-67 (O'Connor,
J., concurring), with id. at 2467-68 (Scalia, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 2455. For an extensive discussion of the Palazzolo facts and procedural
history, see Tyson Smith, Investment-Backed Expectations, Background Principles and
the Public Interest: Palazzolo and Beyond, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO
Z (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001).
15. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2455.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2455-56. Shore Gardens filed the first application in 1962; however, that
application was denied for clerical reasons. Id. at 2455. Shore Gardens soon filed a
second and then a third application. Id. After initially indicating its approval, the Rhode
Island Department of Natural Resources rejected the proposals, "citing adverse envi-
ronmental impacts." Id. at 2456.
18. Id. The third and final application was referred to the Rhode Island Department
of Natural Resources, which issued a conclusive denial in 1966. Id.
19. Id. at 2455.
20. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2454. In 1971, the state created "the Council," which
is "an agency charged with the duty of protecting the State's Coastal properties." Id.
at 2456. The Council promulgated the regulation that designated saltwater marshes as
"coastal wetlands." Id.
21. Id. at 2456.
22. Id. at 2456. Winnapaug Pond was classified "Type 2 water," and all Type 2
waters were so restricted, Id. at 2458-59.
23. Id. at 2456.
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In 1978, title to the property passed by operation of law to Palazzolo
individually.24 Palazzolo quickly resumed development efforts and in
1983, he filed an application to dredge and fill eighteen acres.25 The
council denied that application as being too substantial. 26 In 1985, Pal-
azzolo submitted a new and significantly smaller development pro-
posal.27 This application was also rejected by the council. The council
concluded that the proposed development could not proceed under any
circumstances because it did not serve a "compelling public purpose"
and was therefore inconsistent with the regulatory standard for a special
exemption. 28
Finding no relief in his appeal of the administrative decision, Pal-
azzolo filed a takings claim.29 Palazzolo alleged that the regulation had
deprived him of all economically viable use of his property.30 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected his takings claim.31 The court
held that Palazzolo's claim was not ripe; that he was precluded from
challenging any regulations enacted before he acquired title to the prop-
erty; and finally, that the parcel retained economically viable use.32
IH. Majority Opinion
A. Ripeness
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank,33 the Court established its infamous "ripeness" barrier to applied
(as compared to facial) regulatory takings lawsuits. The ripeness barrier
24. Id. at 2456. In 1978, Shore Gardens' corporate charter was revoked for failure
to pay income taxes, and title to the property passed to Palazzolo as sole share-
holder. Id.
25. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2455. This application was to dredge and fill the entire
parcel for development.
26. Id.
27. Id. This application was to dredge and fill eleven acres for a private beach club.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2456. The courts held that the Council's decision was consistent with state
administrative law.
30. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2456. Palazzolo claimed damages of $3,150,000, the
estimated value of a seventy-four lot subdivision. The trial court found for the state.
Id. at 2547.
31. Id. at 2457-58.
32. Id. at 2458. As to ripeness, the claim was premature, the court held, because
Palazzolo had not demonstrated that a more modest proposal would also have been
rejected. Id. The court also rejected Palazzolo's claim because it reasoned that neither
a total nor a partial takings claim could be sustained for any regulation enacted before
he acquired title. Id. at 2457. As to the merits of the total takings claim, Palazzolo
conceded that he had $200,000 in development value remaining, and the court held
that this defeated any total taking claim. Id. The court did not reach the partial taking
claim because of the time bar it erected. See id.
33. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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has a two-part requirement: (1) a final decision under government reg-
ulatory laws; and (2) a seeking of just compensation under the state's
eminent domain procedures.34 The ripeness issue was a significant ele-
ment of the Palazzolo majority's analysis because the inability to bring
takings challenges has made it difficult to reach the takings questions.3 5
As there was no question that Palazzolo had pursued and been denied
compensation in state court, the second requirement was clearly met.36
The first requirement-the finality element-however, needed to be
addressed.
The finality element of the ripeness barrier was erected, the Court
reasoned, because the determination of whether a regulation has ef-
fected a taking cannot be made "until a court knows 'the extent of the
permitted development' on the land in question. '37 Thus, "the central
question in resolving the ripeness issue," the Court concluded, "is
whether [Palazzolo] obtained a final decision from the Council deter-
mining the permitted use for the land. '38
Applying this test, the Court held that the Council had in fact made
a final decision with respect to development on Palazzolo's property.39
34. See id. at 186. For a critical commentary on Hamilton Bank, see Michael M.
Berger, Happy Birthday, Constitution: The Supreme Court Establishes New Ground
Rules for Land-Use Planning, 20 URB. LAW 735 (1988); Michael M. Berger, "Ripe-
ness" Test for Land Use Cases Needs Reform: Reconciling Leading Ninth Circuit
Decisions Is an Exercise in Futility, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57 (1988); Michael
M. Berger, The Civil Rights Act: An Alternative Remedy for Property Owners Which
Avoids Some of the Procedural Traps and Pitfalls in Traditional "Takings" Litigation,
12 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 121 (1989); Michael M. Berger, The "Ripeness" Mess in
Federal Land Use Cases or How the Supreme Court Converted Federal Judges into
Fruit Peddlers, 1991 INST. ON PLAN. ZONING & EMINENT DOMAIN § 7; Brian W.
Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness
and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73
(1988); Douglas W. Kmiec, Disentangling Substantive Due Process and Taking
Claims, 13 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 57 (1990); R. Jeffrey Lyman, Finality Ripeness
in Federal Land Use Cases from Hamilton Bank to Lucas, 9 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
L. 101 (1993); Daniel R. Mandelker & Michael M. Berger, A Plea to Allow the Federal
Courts to Clarify the Law of Regulatory Takings, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jan.
1990, at 3; Daniel R. Mandelker & Brian W. Blaesser, Applying the Ripeness Doctrine
in Federal Land Use Litigation, 11 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 49 (1988); Gregory
Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of Decisions Show-
ing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use Cases, 10
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91 (1994); Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selec-
tion in Fifth Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 37 (1995);
Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND.
L. REv. 1 (1995).
35. See, e.g., Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.
36. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458.
37. Id. (quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 351
(1986)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
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To reach this conclusion, the Court relied upon the "unequivocal nature
of the wetland regulations at issue and ... the Council's application of
the regulations to the subject property." 40 That is, no development
would ever be permitted on or near Winnapaug Pond, or any other
"Type 2 water," without a special exemption from the Council, and the
Council refused to grant such an exemption unless a "compelling public
purpose" would be served.4 Given this stringent regulation and the
Council's clear ruling that neither of the proposed developments qual-
ified for the exemption, the Court easily concluded that Palazzolo's
claim was ripe for review.42
The state had argued that because "a landowner must give a land-
use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion," Palazzolo was
required to submit another, more modest proposal before bringing a
takings claim.43 The Court, however, found that this would be futile
because the "ripeness doctrine does not require a landowner to submit
applications for their own sake." 44 Rather, once "the permissible uses
of the property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a taking
case is likely to have ripened. '45 Because the limitations imposed by
the wetland regulations were clear and there was no indication that any
substantial development would have been permitted, the claim was ripe
without further applications.46
B. Passage of Title
Having disposed of the ripeness barrier, the Court turned its attention
to the notice issue.47 Before Palazzolo, a number of courts had reasoned
that a preacquisition regulation precluded both total and partial taking
40. Id.
41. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2458-59.
42. Id. at 2459. The Court concluded that the evidence established that the Council
had interpreted its regulations as prohibiting fill for any purpose. Id. Without fill, no
development could proceed and consequently, further applications would have been
pointless. See id.
43. Id. The state also argued that the value of the upland parcel was uncertain. See
id. at 2460-61. The Court disagreed, noting that the state accepted a valuation of
$200,000 for the upland parcel at trial and on appeal, and therefore could not now
attempt to manufacture a new controversy. See id.
44. Id. at 2460.
45. Id. at 2459.
46. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2462. In a final ripeness argument, the state asserted
that because Palazzolo based his valuation on the value of his property with the seventy-
four lot subdivision, he was required to submit another proposal for that development,
have that rejected, and then bring his takings claim. Id. at 2461. The Court held that
the state's argument lacked merit, because no fill was permitted and no development
could occur without fill. Id. at 2461-62. Therefore, the extent of permissible devel-
opment was clear. See id. at 2462.
47. Id. at 2462.
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challenges. 48 Applying various analytical theories, these courts essen-
tially concluded that because the landowner had notice of the regulation
or regulatory framework when she purchased the property, she would
reap an impermissible windfall if allowed to challenge the regulation
as unconstitutional. 49 The Rhode Island Supreme Court applied this rule
to Palazzolo's claim. 0 Specifically, the court had held that "the postreg-
ulation acquisition of title was fatal to the claim for deprivation of all
economic use, and to the Penn Central claim."51 That decision, the
Court reasoned, amounted to "a single, sweeping rule: A purchaser or
successive title holder like [Palazzolo] is deemed to have notice of an
earlier-enacted restriction and is barred from claiming that it effects a
taking.""2
The Court quickly found such a rule indefensible. The Court con-
cluded that certain land-use restrictions are "unreasonable and do not
48. See Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("One who
buys with the knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of economic loss."); Outdoor
Graphics, Inc. v. City of Burlington, 103 F.3d 690, 695 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that
an inquiry into whether a regulation is a background principle of state law requires an
examination of the owner's investment-backed expectations); Gazza v. New York State
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035, 1037-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (hold-
ing that no taking occurred because Gazza purchased the property with the knowledge
that he would need a variance, and thus he had no right to build anything and no
cognizable property interest); Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d
388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (denying a permit to fill tideland to prevent another washout of
the plaintiff's property was not a taking because when he purchased the property, a
permit to fill tidelands was required); Brotherton v. Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 675
N.Y.S.2d 121, 122-23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that denying permission to
reconstruct washed-out bulkheads was not a taking because permit requirement pre-
dated the plaintiff's acquisition of the property).
49. See Gazza v. New York State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035,
1038-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that no taking occurred because Gazza pur-
chased the property with the knowledge that he would need a variance, and thus he
had no right to build anything and no cognizable property interest); Grant v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995) (denying a permit to fill
tideland to prevent another washout of the plaintiff's property was not a taking because
when he purchased the property, a permit to fill tidelands was required); Brotherton v.
Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 252 A.D.2d 498, 499 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding
that the denial of permission to reconstruct washed-out bulkheads was not a taking
because permit requirement predated the plaintiff's acquisition of the property); see
also David L. Callies, Regulatory Takings and the Supreme Court: How Perspectives
on Property Rights Have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and What State and
Federal Courts Are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 556-57 (1999) (dis-
cussing other cases that have misapplied the total and partial takings rules-sometimes
flagrantly).
50. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2467.
51. Id. at 2462 (internal citations omitted). The state courts reasoned that such a
purchaser is deemed to have had notice of the regulation. Id. The regulation had there-
fore become a background principle of state law, which barred a total taking. Id. at
2462-63. Notice of the regulation, according to the state courts, also precluded
investment-backed expectations, which barred a partial taking. Id. at 2463.
52. Id.
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become less so through the passage of time or title. 5 3 Under the state
court's rule, however, "the post enactment transfer of title would ab-
solve the State of its obligation to defend any action restricting land
use, no matter how extreme or unreasonable... . A State would be
allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. 54
To the Court, that result was untenable, because"[f]uture generations,
too, have a right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and
value of land."55
In rejecting Palazzolo's total taking claim, the state court had con-
cluded that a preacquisition regulation became a background principle
of state law upon the transfer of title. 6 Of course, the Court noted, the
Lucas "background principles" could save an otherwise total taking. 7
The Court, however, concluded that it had "no occasion to consider the
precise circumstances when a legislative enactment can be deemed a
background principle of state law or whether those circumstances are
present here."58 To the Court, it was sufficient for the disposition of the
case to hold that "a regulation that otherwise would be unconstitutional
absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of
State's law by mere virtue of the passage of title."59
Having held that the preacquisition regulation did not bar Palazzolo' s
total taking claim, the Court examined whether such a taking had in
fact occurred.6°
C. No Total Deprivation of Economically Viable Use
1. THE LUCAS RULE
A land-use regulation totally "takes" property when it leaves the owner
without any "economically beneficial use" of the land.61 The land may
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2462-63.
55. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct at 2463. The Court relied on Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), for precedent. In that case, the Court, in response to an
argument posed by the dissent, noted that so long as the state could not have deprived
the prior owners of the property without compensation, "the prior owners must be
understood to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the lot." Id. (citing
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2).
56. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2462.
57. Id. at 2464.
58. For a discussion of such "background principles," see David L. Callies & J.
David Breemer, Background Principles: Custom, Public Trust and Preexisting Statutes
As Exceptions To Regulatory Takings, in PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATORY TAKINGS:
SEARCHING FOR COMMON GROUND, Ch. 6 (Thomas Roberts ed., 2001).
59. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464. The Court concluded that whether a restriction
or regulation is in fact a background principle of state law will "turn on objective
factors, such as the nature of the land use proscribed." Id. (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1030).
60. See id. at 2464-65.
61. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16
(1992).
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still have value or even retain some limited uses.62 It makes no differ-
ence what the landowner knew or should have known about the regu-
latory climate when the landowner acquired the land. 63 Instead, the rule
is utterly simple: if the owner is left with no beneficial economic use
of the land, then the government must pay for the land or rescind the
regulation (and possibly pay compensation for the time during which
the illegal regulation affected the relevant land), unless the regulation
falls within two exceptions: nuisance or background principles of a
state's law of property.6
All these rules come from the U.S. Supreme Court's 1992 decision
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,61 together with some gloss
added by recent decisions of the Federal Circuit.66 It is worth examining
the elements of total takings in a bit more detail to fully understand the
reach of what the Court calls this categorical or per se rule.
In Lucas, the Court was presented with an ideal vehicle in which to
set out criteria for deciding both total and partial takings cases. It did
so in the first category-total takings-in the opinion itself.67 It did so
in the second category in footnotes. 68 The rule with respect to total
takings that the Lucas Court announced is a narrow one: a regulation
that removes all productive or economically beneficial use from a parcel
of land is a taking requiring compensation under the Fifth Amend-
ment.69 Note that the Court writes of use and not value. 70 "Salvage"
uses, such as camping and picnicking, do not count as "economically-
beneficial" uses, such as building a house.71 It is a taking regardless of
how or when the property was acquired, regardless of the "expecta-
tions" of, or notice to, the landowner, and, of course, regardless of the
public purpose or state interest that generated the regulation. 72 For too
long, according to the Court, police power regulations have primarily
62. See, e.g., id. at 1018.
63. See, e.g., id. at 1027.
64. See, e.g., id. at 1032.
65. 505 U.S. 1003.
66. See Palm Beach Isles Ass'n v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(holding that defendant's denial of a dredging permit was a categorical taking because
it rendered plaintiffs' submerged land valueless, but remanding for a factual determi-
nation as to whether defendant's purpose provided a nuisance defense based on the
navigable servitude), reh'g granted, 231 F.3d. 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding
that when a categorical regulatory taking occurs, the property owner is entitled to
recovery without consideration of investment-backed expectations).
67. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
68. See, e.g., id. at 1016, n. 7.
69. See id. at 1016-19. Note this is not the same as rendering the lots or parcels
valueless, as some commentators would have it. See, e.g., ROBERT MELTZ et al., THE
TAKINGS ISSUE 140, 218 (1999).
70. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-19.
71. See, e.g., id. at 1050.
72. Id. at 1019.
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conferred "public benefits. '73 For this the public must clearly pay, rather
than the landowner upon whom the burden of such regulation falls:
"Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only
if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin
with. 74
Herein lie the Lucas exceptions to the per se rule-relied upon by
the state court in Palazzolo-of total takings: the Court requires com-
pensation for taking of all economically beneficial use unless there can
be identified "background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the uses [the landowner] now intends in the circumstances in
which the property is presently found. '75
2. PALAZZOLO'S CLAIM
Applying this test to Palazzolo's claim, the Court held that the pro-
scription had not denied him all economically viable use of his prop-
erty.76 The parties agreed that the property retained $200,000 in devel-
73. Id. at 1024.
74. Id. at 1027. For a historical argument that much private use of wetlands is not
part of such title, see Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands
at Common Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (1996).
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031. Therefore, if the common law of the state would allow
neighbors or the state to prohibit the two houses that Lucas wants to construct because
they are either public or private nuisances, then the state can prohibit them under the
coastal-zone law without providing compensation. This result occurs because such
nuisance uses are always unlawful and are never part of a landowner's title, so prohib-
iting them by statute would not take away any property rights. The Court gives as an
example a law that might prohibit a landowner from filling his land to flood his neigh-
bor's land. Id. at 1029. Alternatively, if the background principles of the state's property
law would penmit such prohibition of use as the two houses Lucas proposed to con-
struct, then again no compensation is required. However, the Court did not fully de-
scribe these principles, nor did it discuss them except in a nuisance context. Id. For
commentary arguing that only nuisance is a background principle exception, see Meltz,
supra note 69, at 377. For extended commentary on the Lucas exceptions, see Louise
A. Halper, Why the Nuisance Knot Can't Undo the Takings Muddle, 28 IND. L. REV.
329 (1995); Todd D. Brody, Comment, Examining the Nuisance Exception to the Tak-
ings Clause: Is There Life for Environmental Regulations After Lucas?, 4 FORDHAM
ENVTL. L. J. 287 (1993); J. Bradley Horn, Case Note, Eminent Domain-Loss of All
Economically Beneficial Use of Real Property Constitutes a "Taking" Within Meaning
of Fifth Amendment Unless Principles of State Property and Nuisance Law Give Rise
to Restrictions on Land's Use-Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992), 43 DRAKE L. REV. 227 (1994); Brian D. Lee, Note, Constitutional Law-
Fifth Amendment-Regulatory Takings Depriving All Economically Viable Use of a
Property Owner's Land Require Just Compensation Unless the Government Can Iden-
tify Common Law Nuisance or Property Principles Furthered by the Regulation-Lucas
v. South Carloine [sic] Coastal Council, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1840 (1993).
76. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2464.
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opment value. 7 Therefore, the Court held that while leaving the
landowner with a "token interest" does not defeat a total taking claim,
a regulation that permits "a landowner to build a substantial residence
on an 18-acre parcel does not leave the property 'economically idle.' ' 78
3. THE DENOMINATOR ISSUE
In his brief to the Court, Palazzolo had argued that the upland parcel
was distinct from the wetlands and therefore, it should not be consid-
ered when determining whether the property retains an economically
viable use. 79 Common to both total and partial takings analyses, this
raised the redoubtable "denominator issue." We have already seen how
the Supreme Court framed the issue in Lucas. The principle question
is: what is the extent of the landowner's property interest to be consid-
ered in deciding whether the interest allegedly damaged is partially
taken?
Both Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United States80 and Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States8 discussed the denominator issue in the
context of denials of section 404 (Clean Water Act) dredge and fill
permits by the Army Corps of Engineers.8 2 These courts were willing
to follow the rationale of Lucas and consider a portion of the plaintiff's
entire property in assessing deprivation of all economically beneficial
use.83 For example, out of 250 acres, the court was willing to consider
only the devaluation of 12.5 acres for which the Corps denied a permit
in Loveladies.84 With the difference being $2.7 million before the permit
denial and $12,500 thereafter, the trial court awarded the $2.7 million,
which the Federal Circuit affirmed.85 Similarly, in East Cape May As-
sociates v. State,86 the court held that the denominator of the parcel
would not include adjacent property subdivided and sold many years
before the enactment of the regulations at issue.87 Again in Palm Beach
Isles v. United States,88 the Federal Circuit held that the relevant parcel
for takings analysis purposes was 50.7 acres rather than 311 acres, then
later separated out a 1.4-acre parcel in its subsequent decision.89
77. Id. at 2460. This value represents the value of a single family home that Pal-
azzolo could develop on the upland portion of his property. Id. at 2457.
78. Id. at 2465 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
79. Id. at 2465.
80. 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
81. 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
82. See id. at 1173, 1179-82; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1562, 1578-79.
83. See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1179-82; Florida Rock, 18 F.3d at 1568-69.
84. See Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1180-81.
85. See id. at 1173-75, 1183.
86. 693 A.2d 114 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1997).
87. See id. at 124.
88. 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
89. Id. at 1381.
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Unfortunately for Palazzolo, he did not raise the denominator issue
in the state courts, and consequently, the Court declined to address this
issue.90 The Court, however, expressed a willingness to revisit the "en-
tire parcel" rule established in Penn Central, when that issue was prop-
erly before the Court. 9'
D. A Penn Central Taking
1. PALAZZOLO'S CLAIM
Although unsuccessful in his total taking claim, the issue of whether
the regulation effected a partial taking remained.92 The Court, however,
was unable to reach the merits of that claim, because the state courts
had not engaged in the requisite factual inquiry.93 Recall, the state courts
simply declared that notice of an existing regulation precluded a partial
taking claim. 94 Having rejected that rule, the Court remanded the case
for further proceedings, consistent with its opinion, to address the par-
tial taking issue.95
2. ADDRESSING THE PARTIAL TAKING CLAIM ON
REMAND
A partial taking occurs whenever a land-use regulation deprives a land-
owner of sufficient use and value and goes beyond a necessary exercise
of the police power for the health, safety, and welfare of the people but
stops short of depriving the landowner of all economically beneficial
use.96 Partial takings by regulation are far more common than total
takings, and the standard is not so easy to apply.
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,97 the Court set
90. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465.
91. Id. In Penn Central, the Court held that the denominator included the entire
value of the company's holdings in the area. 438 U.S. at 130-31. In Lucas, the Court
expressed discomfort with this rule. 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 ("For an extreme-and, we
think, insupportable view of the relevant calculus, see Penn Central Co. v. New York
City[.]"). Legal commentators have since echoed this comment. See Palazzolo, 121 S.
Ct. at 2465.
92. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465. As discussed, the total taking rule is a per se rule,
but a complete loss of economically viable use is required before a landowner may
benefit from its application. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-19. Where a regulation
has merely diminished economic value or opportunity, no total taking has occurred,
but it remains entirely possible that the regulation has effected a partial taking of
property. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. Consequently, courts generally
analyze both claims. See Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998);
District Intown Props. v. Dist. of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Walcek
v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 462 (Fed. Cl. 2000); Adams Outdoor Adver. v. City of
E. Lansing, 614 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. 2000); K & K Construction, Inc. v. Dep't of
Natural Res., 456 Mich. 570 (Mich. 1998); Alegria v. R.E. Keeney, 687 A.2d 1249
(R.I. 1997).
93. Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465.
94. Id. at 2462.
95. Id. at 2465.
96. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
97. Id.
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out the rules for partial takings. The Court upheld New York City's
Landmarks Preservation Law which effectively prohibited Penn Central
from constructing a fifty-five story office building in the air rights above
Grand Central Station, a designated landmark under the law.98 Penn
Central claimed that the designation and the prohibition constituted
both a facial and applied taking of its property under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 99 The Court disagreed and held that "land-
marking" itself was broadly constitutional and that the individual ap-
plication of the law to Grand Central Station left sufficient remaining
use of the property so as to be neither a total nor a partial taking. I°°
Before reaching the merits of the case, however, the Court discussed
in some detail the standards that applied in partial takings cases.' 0l The
Court suggested "several factors" that have "particular significance"
when it engages in "these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries":10 2
[1.] The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.
[2.] So, too, is the character of the governmental action.
[3.] A "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic
life to promote the common good)03
A number of cases pick up this theme of "investment-backed expec-
tations," including the Lucas decision discussed above. I While largely
devoted to answering the blistering barrage directed at the Court by the
dissent (for example, the dissent's opening salvo is: "Today the Court
launches a missile to kill a mouse,"'0 5) the notes evince a clear intention
to allow compensation for taking of less than all economic use if and
when such a taking is before the Court. For example, at footnote eight,
the Court responds to a dissent criticism that compensation for regu-
latory taking of all economic use is not consistent with lack of com-
pensation for regulatory taking of, say, 95 percent of economic use:
98. Id. at 115-16, 138.
99. See id. at 128-29.
100. See id. at 128-38.
101. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 128-38.
102. See id. at 123-28.
103. Id. at 124 (citations omitted).
104. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8; Adams Outdoor Adver. v. City of E. Lansing,
614 N.W.2d 634 (Mich. 2000); Walcek v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 462 (Fed. Cl.
2000); Dist. Intown Props. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998); K & K Constr., Inc. v.
Dep't of Natural Res., 575 N.W.2d 531 (Mich. 1998); Alegria v. R.E. Keeney, 687
A.2d 1249 (R.I. 1997).
105. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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This analysis errs in its assumption that the landowner whose deprivation is one step
short of complete is not entitled to compensation. Such an owner might not be able
to claim the benefit of our categorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged
time and again, "[tihe economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and...
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations" are keenly relevant to takings analysis generally.'l
This "frustration of investment-backed expectations" standard,
which the Court chose not to apply in Lucas because it characterized
the regulatory taking as total, is clearly not rejected. Indeed, one con-
curring member of the Court (Justice Kennedy) would have applied
it.107 Moreover, in an earlier footnote, the Court had already alluded to
the utility of the "reasonable expectations standard," though in a
slightly different context, that of deciding how thin to slice property
interests (or, alternatively, how many sticks in the Holfeldian bundle)
for purposes of deciding whether property has been taken:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically feasible use"
rule is greater than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the "property
interest" against which the loss of value is to be measured. When, for example, a
regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is
unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or
as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a
whole. [The note then criticizes that portion of the New York state court's decision
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, which suggested nearby prop-
erty of the owner could be amalgamated with that portion he claimed was unusual
in deciding whether a taking by regulation had occurred.] . .. The answer to this
difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been
shaped by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's
law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in land
with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination
of) value. 108
On remand, the state court must balance these Penn Central factors
to determine whether denying all construction, save a single family
home on an eighteen-acre parcel, is indeed a partial taking of property
without compensation.
IV. Concurring Opinions
The concurring opinions foreshadowed an important issue, which is
directly relevant to Palazzolo's partial taking claim and the Penn Cen-
106. Id. at 1019 n.8 (alteration in original) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104,
124).
107. Id. at 1032-36. (Kennedy, J., Concurring).
108. Id. at 1016 n.7 (emphasis added) (majority opinion). For a different perspective
on the "investment-backed expectations" standards, see Daniel R. Mandelker,
Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URn. LAW. 215 (1995); Lynda J.
Oswald, Cornering the Quark: Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Vi-
able Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. Rnv. 91 (1995).
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tral test in general: what effect does the postregulation acquisition
of property have on the claimant's "distinct investment-backed
expectations"?
Before discussing that issue, it is critical to first observe that the
investment-backed expectations rule of Penn Central has no applica-
bility to the Lucas per se rule. One will search in vain for any such
implication. 0 9 Indeed, the Federal Circuit so held in late 2000.110 That
court concluded:
In sum, we conclude that, in accord with Lucas, and not inconsistent with any prior
holdings of this court, when a regulatory taking, properly determined to be "cate-
gorical," is found to have occurred, the property owner is entitled to a recovery
without regard to consideration of investment-backed expectations. In such a case,
"reasonable investment-backed expectations" are not a proper part of the analysis,
just as they are not in the physical takings cases."'
Thus a preacquisition regulation will save an otherwise total taking
only if it is in fact a background principle of state law," 2 which is a
very difficult case to make following Palazzolo. 3
In analyzing a partial regulatory taking claim-governed by Penn
Central-however, the claimant's investment-backed expectations re-
main a relevant inquiry. 14 A preacquisition regulation might therefore
be viewed as shaping such expectations, which could then influence
the determination of whether a taking has in fact occurred. That is the
source of the schism between Justices Scalia and O'Connor.
According to Justice O'Connor," 15 the state court erred only in hold-
ing that "the preacquisition enactment of the use restriction ipso facto
109. The Court compared total taking to physical taking, where, of course, any
investment-backed expectations, or lack thereof, are wholly irrelevant. See Lucas, 505
U.S. 1015-18; see also Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354,
1362 ("Had the Court intended to make analysis of a categorical regulatory taking
different from the categorical physical taking, for example regarding the question of
investment-backed expectations, surely somewhere in the opinion there would have
been a hint of it. There is not.").
110. 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
111. Palm Beach Isles Ass'n, 231 F.3d at 1354, 1364; see also R.S. Radford & J.
David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. State Clarify the Supreme
Court's Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings
Law? 9 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 449 (2001); Barry M. Hartman, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: The Takings Test Turns a Comer, 23 ENvTL. L. REP. 1003 (1993)
("[Jiudicial inquiry is not limited to an assessment of the value of the land before and
after the alleged taking occurs.").
112. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. atlO03.
113. See R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 449 (2001); David Callies, Palazzolo and Background Principles of A State's Law
of Property, LAND USE L. & ZON. DiG. (Oct. 2001).
114. See, e.g., Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
115. See Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2465-68. Justice O'Connor concurred with the
majority opinion but wrote separately to express her understanding of the partial takings
issue. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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defeats any takings claim based on that use restriction."' 16 The proper
view, Justice O'Connor concluded, is that the existence of a preacquis-
ition regulation is merely a factor that will shape and define the claim-
ant's investment-backed expectations, 17 and those expectations are in
turn but one of three factors to be weighed when determining whether
a partial taking has occurred. 18 To Justice O'Connor then, the "regu-
latory backdrop against which an owner takes title to property" remains
relevant under Penn Central, but it is not the only consideration.19
Justice Scalia,120 on the other hand, emphasized that the mere passage
of time and title should not transform an unconstitutional regulatory
taking into permissible state action.' 2' Rather, Justice Scalia concluded,
The "investment-backed expectations" that the law will take into account do not
include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives property of so much
of its value as to be unconstitutional. Which is to say that a Penn Central Taking,
no less than a total taking, is not absolved by the transfer of title.
22
Under this view, a regulation must be as constitutional to the last
purchaser as it is to the first.
116. Id. at 2465.
117. Id. at 2465-66.
118. Id. at 2466.
119. Id. at 2467. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor expressed her dis-
agreement with Justice Scalia's concurring opinion. For example, Justice O'Connor
stated, "Justice Scalia's inapt 'government-as-thief simile is symptomatic of the larger
failing of his opinion[.]" Id. This disagreement with Justice Scalia reflects her belief
that there should be no bright-line rules for the Takings Clause; rather, she believes
that the courts should carefully examine all circumstances and weigh the relevant con-
siderations. Id. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, believes in bright-line rules as a means
of preventing each decision from turning on the individual predilections of a particular
court.
120. Justice Scalia concurred with the majority opinion but wrote separately "to
make clear that [his] understanding of how [the partial takings issue] must be consid-
ered on remand is not Justice O'Connor's." Palazzolo, 121 S. Ct. at 2467 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
121. See id. at 2468. Justice Scalia rejected the "windfall" argument posited by
Justice O'Connor, stating that a perceptive--or simply lucky-developer, who realizes
the unconstitutionality of a regulation, should not be forced to suffer under it merely
because he took title after the restriction became effective. See id. at 2467-68.
122. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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